---> MOVING BEYOND METAPHORS <--- _________(AND MUSIC)

I've been doing some interesting reading for a philosophy of mind course; 'The Theory of Human Problem Solving' by Herbert Simon and Albert Newell fascinated me. In the early 70s these two authors decided to attempt a general theory of the processes underlying problem solving. This was a departure from previous research in this field, which had, in large part, focused only on insight and the cognitive processes involved. They begin by delineating some general propositions, which their paper goes on to elaborate upon in the body of the essay. A search through a problem space during human problem solving is a plausible idea. In fact, the structure of the problem space is so important it can delineate possible programs as functional or impossible to implement, thus having a large impact upon behavior. Perhaps they could be blamed (or praised) for the death of disco. The sartorial structures were just completely unsustainable: high heels for men (with dead goldfish inside), pants and dresses so tight it’s a wonder people could walk in them, let alone dance, and a plethora of Quaaludes, a hypnotic that turned your legs to jelly, obviating the ability to dance. This is an example of a problem space with obvious and drastic effects on problem solving. If you watch the ‘Simpsons’, Disco Stu says its true!

Another really interesting text that crossed my cortex was 'Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis' by Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn. Connectionism was a theory very much in vogue in the 80s, the Madonna of the theory of mind. However, academia, like pop culture, has its own trends and fashions. The public’s music tastes swung back towards guitars and real instruments after growing weary of the tinny constraints (at that time) of synthesizers, culminating in the early 90s with the grunge movement. In an analogous manner, the academic community began to challenge connectionism and its limitations. This paper is one of the first to attempt this, making Fodor and Pylyshyn akin to the Pixies or Black Sabbath, both progenitors of the grunge sound. They begin with an introduction to Connectionism and its clash with Classicism, pointing to problems with Connectionist diagrams that claim to be Representationalist, a claim that is reevaluated. Connectionist models and the part mental processes play in them are examined, instigating a preliminary assessment of the ideas of ‘productivity’ and ‘systematicity’. In this light, they end by redefining Connectionism as a theory different from what was accepted wisdom at the time. Fascinating stuff but I think I might smash my TV if the authors got their own reality show like Ozzy Osbourne did.

As much fun as using metaphors to explain different theories of the mind is, at least one academic thinks we need to get over it. The cool thing is that the guy advocating this is actually a professor at my university: Chris Eliasmith. Check out his cybercredentials:

http://watarts.uwaterloo.ca/~celiasmi/

Past approaches to understanding the mind, including symbolism, connectionism, and dynamicism, have all relied on the metaphor to ground their theories. Discarding metaphor as a tool to build his theory but utilizing all the strongest aspects of those theories he has left behind, in 'Moving Beyond Metaphors: Understanding the Mind for What It Is', Eliasmith postulates a neural systems theory rooted in representational and dynamic concepts (R & D Theory). Neural representation is delineated by coding and encoding relations. These representations can be transformed by variables consisting of neural groups that determine the change by decoding. Furthermore, by cconsidering these neural representations in the context of neural dynamics, they can be perceived as control theoretic state variables, the upshot being that the operations of neurobiological systems are amenable to control theory analysis. Brilliant stuff (and I'm lucky enough to have people like him around all the time!)

Each of these articles had something worth pondering, which should be the goal of a nonfiction writer (or blogger). For example, in the first article one must learn to always be ready to think and explore outside established parameters. Likewise, the second article reminds us to challenge orthodoxy and think critically. (Incidentally, Curt Kobain was left-handed and couldn’t afford a lefty guitar, so he played his instrument upside down.) My favourite article was the third one. Eliasmith strikes me as intellectually flexible, yet with a brainstem of steel. He seems to be a pragmatist in the sense that Dewey would have used the word, something I greatly admire. Realizing there were several concepts of value in the theories he couldn’t abide by, he discarded the theories but took whatever procedure or concepts were useful to him. Furthermore, I have long thought (pretty much since I started Philosophy in 1994) that speaking about the mind in metaphorical terms has limited usefulness. If we look back over the history of the philosophy of mind, the dominant discourse has usually revolved around the technology of that time. It has been helpful in some respects but I am not sure we learned much about the true nature of mind, but rather how we see ourselves reflected in the world, an unadmitted ego validation.